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The Summit Water Distribution Company, Leon H. Saunders, Stuart Knowles,
Trilogy Limited, L.P. and Lynn Nelson (collectively "Summit Water"), Appellants,
pursuant to Appellate Rule 24(c), submits this Reply brief to Appellee's Brief
INTRODUCTION
The issue before the Court is whether Summit County is entitled to claim that its
authority to regulate water rights, water appropriation, water source capacity or facilities
for culinary water rests upon the County Land Use Development Management Act
("CLUDMA").

Defendants concede that CLUDMA does not expressly grant to the

counties authority for such water regulation. Neither do Defendants dispute the existence
of a comprehensive statutory scheme which places responsibility for regulation of all
aspects of water, water companies and water facilities with the State of Utah.
Rather than explain to this Court why it should conclude that Summit County's
comprehensive regulation of water is a land use zoning decision authorized by
CLUDMA, contrary to express provisions of CLUDMA and contrary to the Supreme
Court's decision Toone v. Weber County, 2002 UT 103, Defendants instead argue that
the only relevant inquiry is whether Summit County, in adopting Concurrency Ordinance
No. 436, declared that "they consider [the Ordinance] necessary for the use and
development of land within the County." Appellee's Br. at p. 17.

According to

Defendants, that statement is magical and this Court is obligated to defer to the County's
invented conclusion that, first, its regulation is authorized as a land use zoning decision
under CLUDMA and, second, that it has properly promulgated the ordinance pursuant to
that authority. Under Defendants' analysis, the County has the power to determine its
1

own authority under CLUDMA and to then determine that is has acted within the scope
of that self-declared authority. Moreover, the Court, according to Defendants, must defer
to those determinations, presuming their validity.
Unless this Court adopts Defendants' ipse dixit argument, and thereby give the
County virtually unlimited, self-defined, authority under CLUDMA, Defendants'
argument must fail.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The lower court dismissed Summit Water's claims against Defendants as untimely
under the 30-day limitation of section 17-27-1001 of CLUDMA. Those claims asserted
Defendants' fraudulent failure to comply with, or to enforce, the Summit County
Concurrency Ordinance and requested injunctive relief requiring compliance with the its
provisions.

The issue for this Court's determination is whether the State of Utah

authorized Summit County to adopt an ordinance for the regulation of water through
CLUDMA.
Defendants first argue that CLUDMA, and specifically section 17-27-401
providing authority to "enact a zoning ordinance establishing regulations for land use and
development," authorizes the comprehensive water regulation found in Ordinance No.
436, because of the broad authority granted under that provision.

Defendants' sole

authority for this proposition is the note of second year law student Adam Strachan
entitled

NOTE: Concurrency Laws:

Water as a Land Use Regulation, 21 J. Land

Resources & Envtl. L. 435 (2001) written with the assistance of Summit County
Commissioner, and concurrency architect, Eric Schifferli.
2

The provisions of CLUDMA

are devoid of any such express grant of authority, as Defendants tacitly concede, forcing
them to adopt the untenable position that the County has virtually unlimited authority
under CLUDMA. Moreover, the fact that the State of Utah, through the State Engineer,
Water Board and Division of Drinking Water, has established comprehensive legislation
and rules for the regulation of water demonstrates that such regulation is not an aim of
CLUDMA. CLUDMA did not authorize Summit County to adopt Ordinance No. 436
and the lower court erred in dismissing Summit Water's claim based on the provisions of
that act.
Defendants also argue that because Summit County purportedly determined that
Ordinance No. 436 was necessary for land use planning, this Court must simply defer to
that assessment by the County. Defendants' argument, that the County can determine its
own authority and then legislate pursuant to that determination without meaningful
judicial review, would vest in the County virtually unlimited authority. CLUDMA both
empowers the County and limits its authority. Because the State of Utah has not
authorized Summit County to regulate water rights, water appropriations, water
companies and water facilities under CLUDMA, Summit County's arguments must fail
and the trial court ruling must be reversed.

3

ARGUMENT
I.

THE SUMMIT COUNTY WATER CONCURRENCY ORDINANCE,
WHICH REGULATES WATER RIGHTS, WATER APPROPRIATION,
WATER SOURCE CAPACITY AND FACILITIES FOR THE PROVISION
OF CULINARY WATER, IS NOT A LAND USE ZONING ORDINANCE.
Summit County Ordinance No. 436 empowers the Summit County Director of

Health to review the "water rights, water source capacity, reserve source capacity, storage
capacity, system capacity, recurrent number of service connections, outstanding
commitments/boards/service letters and other system demands, any surplus capacity and
number of ERC's that it can serve with its surplus capacity . . ." and to preclude use of
water rights, water source capacities and water source facilities in Summit County
based on that review. (Ordinance No. 436; R. 042-48.) The Ordinance does far more
than allow the County to "evaluate" water companies and their resources as argued by
Defendants. It allows the County to preclude a water company from using water rights,
appropriations, sources, source capacity and facilities despite the fact that all have been
reviewed and approved by the State of Utah under its comprehensive regulation in those
areas.
Notwithstanding the obvious nature of that Ordinance as a water regulation,
Defendants argue that Ordinance No. 436 must be found to be a land use zoning
regulation, promulgated pursuant to CLUDMA, because in adopting that Ordinance,
Summit County declared that it was. The County having so declared, Defendants
continue in their argument, it is beyond the power of this Court to look further to
determine whether CLUDMA does, in fact, empower Summit County to regulate water.

4

Thus, Defendants arrive at the allegedly inescapable conclusion that under CLUDMA,
the State has granted to Summit County authority to do virtually whatever it desires
provided only that it declare that the object of its desire is "considered] necessary for the
use and development of land within the County . . . ." Appellee's Brief at p. 17.
Contrary to that argument, CLUDMA is not a blanket carte blanche grant of authority
from the State to Summit County and neither is Ordinance No. 436 a land use regulation.
A.

CLUDMA Does Not Authorize Summit County to Regulate Water
Under the Guise of a Land Use Zoning Decision.

Counties are devoid of authority to legislate except to the extent that authority is
expressly granted to them by the State of Utah. E.g., Hatch v. Boulder Town Council
2001 UT App. 55, 21 P.3d 245. Through CLUDMA the State of Utah granted counties
authority "to regulate land use" through the enactment of ordinances and granting of
permits relating to zoning and subdivisions. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-102; Toone v.
Weber County, 2002 UT 103 lj 7, 57 P.3d 1079. In Toone v. Weber County the Utah
Supreme Court specifically identified those areas over which CLUDMA granted
counties' authority, none of which encompass water regulation, and thereafter stated:
It is these substantive decisions, made in compliance with
proper procedures that the term "land use decisions" in § 1727-1001 unambiguously refers.
Id. at Tf 8. Thus the term "land use decision" is defined by the authority actually granted
to the counties under CLUDMA and is not subject to definition by the county acting
outside of such authority. Although Defendants cite to the language of Utah Code Ann. §
17-27-102 with regard to the general purposes of CLUDMA, they fail to comment on the

5

noticeable absence from those provisions of any purpose in CLUDMA to empower the
counties to regulate water rights, water appropriation or use, water source capacity or
water facilities. Indeed, Defendants have cited to no provision of CLUDMA empowering
the counties to undertake such water regulation.
Instead of addressing that absence of regulatory authorization, and undoubtedly
because of that absence, Defendants argue that "CLUDMA's grant of authority is
actually extremely broad," encompassing the regulation of water. Appellees' Br. at 16.
As authority for the foregoing proposition, Defendants rely exclusively upon a law
review note written by second year law student Adam Strachan entitled NOTE:
Concurrency Laws: Water as a Land Use Regulation, 21 J. Land Resources & Envtl. L.
435 (2001).1 The student Strachan states:
The authority to enact Ordinance No. 400 comes from two
provisions of the Utah Code. The first, Section 17-27-401
delegates general zoning powers to the County for
establishing "regulations for land use and development."
Second, Section 17-50-302, delegates general police powers
to the County which must be exercised to "perform functions
that are reasonably related to the safety, health, morals and
welfare" of the County's inhabitants.
Id. at 451. Aside from the statutes themselves, Mr. Strachan cites no authority for the
foregoing proposition that an ordinance providing for comprehensive regulation of water

1

Conspicuously absent from Defendants' citation to Mr. Strachan's article is the fact that
it is a second year law student note. Also absent is any mention of the fact that Mr.
Strachan specifically thanks Summit County Commissioner Eric Schifferli, one of the
architects of the Summit County Concurrency Ordinances, for his assistance in writing
the note.
6

should be determined to be a land use zoning ordinance under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27401.
It is not surprising that Defendants' argument is reduced to leiinuv .*r •'•.
note. Apparently created U N h\cr the County's authority to regulate water. ih<; n< s^ H
cc:s :^noi is in

- absence of any persuasive aulhoniy supporting Defendants position.

In point of law, there snr.p
regulate water as a laud use zoning decision.2
•. i .-viendants u k u> c herokee Water & Sanitation District v. El Paso
Count \
authority under CLUDMA. In that case, however, the Court found a county regulation
requiring a three hundred year supply of wnter *™ Mcw suhdh ision^ to be expressly
ai itl 101 ized by Cc I :>i aide state s

•

••

\-HV.^M>

-

eouiiiies from approving subdivisions absent evidence from the developer establishing
"that definite provision has been made for a water supply that is sufliuent in terms of
i|iiiihlil>

lii'fKluliihllh

illlil

i|

Ills

lii i | t i i i' lull* , i l i m p p r u p i i l l l l "

ll|>pl'i

ul

VuiU'l

m Ills

I

|U

of subdivisions proposed." Id. at 1341. In light of that express prohibition anu direction
to 'he Counh • - the State, the Court found that the County acted appropriately and

2

In the lower court. Defendants attempted to rely upon VJUIUCH \. i own oi Kainapo, 285
N.E.2d2c)l (Cl. App. N.Y. 197J) for that proposition. However, as Summit Water points
• ' :-*• opening brief, Town of Ramapo did not involve an Ordinance under which the
i own purported to regulate water. Rather, the Ordinance in question in that case simply
ired the existence of certain basic facilities, presumably regulated under other laws,
... r - <;^M ,.i.v-*.*-.cnf to be approved.
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within the bounds of its authority in adopting the regulation in question. No such state
legislation, however, exists in Utah.3
As discussed in Golden v. Town of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291 (Ct. App. N.Y.
1972), concurrency ordinances, generally meaning those ordinances which require
development of essential facilities concurrent with development, have had their genesis in
the area of land use development. In no case cited by Defendants, and in no case found
by Plaintiffs, however, has any such concurrency ordinance purported to regulate those
essential facilities themselves, whether they are water, schools, roads, or other such
facilities.
B.

Defendants9 Argument for Virtually Unlimited Authority Under
CLUDMA is Without Basis.

Defendants cannot, and therefore do not, dispute that in Utah, the State Engineer is
charged with general supervisory responsibility over the waters of the State. Utah Code
Ann. § 73-2-1. Neither can Defendants dispute that the Drinking Water Board, through
Division of Drinking Water ("DDW"), has promulgated voluminous detailed regulations
governing the quality and quantity of drinking water sources and the design and operation
of drinking water facilities of its systems (Utah Admin. Code R. 309-100-705) or that
DDW has promulgated comprehensive requirements for source development, facility
design and operation, water quality, source sizing and transmission and distribution
pipelines (Utah Admin. Code R. 309-204, 500, 505, 510 and 550). Neither is the
3

Like Ramapo, the regulation at issue in Cherokee Water simply required the developer
to show a water source. It did not purport to regulate that water source. Ordinance No.
436, on the other hand, purports to regulate virtually every aspect of water and the
companies and facilities providing water in Summit County.
8

conservative methodology utilized in state regulatory requirements to assure continuing
adeqi late watei si ipplie s qi lestioi led b> Defei idai its

I Ital i - uii i lii 1 C : >de R 309 510 II

Rather, Defendants simply state that "the existence of state regulation is wllolly
immaterial to the County's authority under C I / T D M A " in lk'hi of tlit C o u n t y ' s
u

:

-:

finding

> piit in place siimciciii i h n . r i ,IL <.-I water companies ability

to provide actual wet water to development. (Appellee's Brief at p 16 )
The comprehensive regulatory scheme set forth in the D D W ' s
however, belies Defendants' arguments.

regjiaiu'iis,

i;.^v... a.-^se regulations specilicaih employ

quantities of water, consistentl\ meeting applicable drinking water requirements."
Admin. » ocu

••

..^ (.Kainnlv u Ordinance N»» -J tf Di in ikinj

'

_ 'an

Sunniiit r m j n t ^
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areas covered b) the Ordinance, but, muling D D W ' s regulation to be inadequate, states:
" W H E R E A S , neither the Division of Drinking Water nor the County have in the past had
,

J

'f

»

^

l tip*.

*

,

>*

ol a Water Supplier^ waiei system ~,;d appurtenances and no continuing periodic
monitoring has been performed to ensure Water Supplier's continued ability to meet
serv ice dei i lai ids c f its s> ste i i I;

" ' Oi clii lai ice N o 1-36 at p 2; R at 28

' 1 1: le Coi int> ' s

determination that the state is ilot doing an adequate j o b in carrying out those areas in
which it has retained authority, however, provides no basis for passage of legislation
i ii i< h : t CI I JDM i V. .
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Defendants' argument continues that because, in their view, Summit County stated
that the regulation of water under Ordinance No. 436 was necessary for land use and
development, the Court must give deference to, and assume the validity of, that
determination citing for that proposition Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 358 P.2d 633, 636
(Utah 1961); and Mavlor v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 410 P.2d 764, 765-66 (Utah 1966); and
Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1976).
Each of the foregoing cases dealt with decisions as to the zoning of real property under
authority clearly granted by the State of Utah under CLUDMA or its municipal
counterpart. In none of those cases was there an issue considered or determined by the
Court as to whether CLUDMA, or its municipal counterpart, actually authorized the
substantive action, i.e., the micro-management of state water rights and regulations, taken
by the county or municipality as a land use decision. That, of course, is the only issue
before this Court.
The County's authority to regulate land use is both authorized and limited by the
grant of such authority from the State of Utah under CLUDMA. See, Hatch v. Boulder
Town Council 2001 UT App. 55, % 7, 21 P.3d 245, 247; Toone, 2002 UT 103 Tj 7, 57
P.3d 1079. As the Supreme Court found in Toone, "land use decisions" are defined by
the specific authority granted to the County under the express provisions of CLUDMA.
Contrary to Defendants' argument that the Court must defer to Summit County's
determination that its water regulation ordinance is, in fact, a land use ordinance, in
reality the County must "strictly comply with the statute delegating them the authority to
act." Hatch, 2001 UT App. 55 If 7, 21 P.3d at 247.
10

In determining whether Summit County Ordinance N o 4 " 6 was p r o m u l g a t e d
pursuant to ai itl ioi it)/ gi ai ite d t :) Si u i 11 i lit Cc i n lty i n idei CI \ JDIV 1 A, 1 10 deference need be
given by the Court to Sui nmit County's self-determination that it has acted appropriately
under tl lat statute. Rather, it is within 1u- ek-ar jurisdiction of the Coi irt to determine
whether tl le State of I Ital 1 1 las ai itl lorized tl le County s action as a ""kind u ^ devi:M.<n. *
I Jndei 11: le pi o\ isioi is :)f CI \ J DN 1 - \ , tl le Si ipi en le Coi ii t's decisioi i ii i I oone ai id ii i light
of the comprehensive State regulation* -! all aspect nl water, water rights. -.\aier
appropriation, water faulilic.* uia; wilier matters relating to water alrcau\ reguiuk^ i ihe

fact, whether or not Summit County viewed its actions in regulating water as "land use
decisions" has ..- iJevance to the determination .- as authority to net under the statute.
j
example.

• *!

i

e Dc: fe i ide w-

• •

-n

-i *

A s s u m e tllat the biate Aeronautics Board establishes an airport m Summit

County on property approved for that use,

Summit County decides that the State

A eroi lai itics Di < ' isic i i of tl le I Jtal i Depai tn lei it i

<.••••

take-offs, and taxiing are not adequate and, relying again on LLUDMA Summit Count)
claims that it is entitled to regulate in more detail ™^roaches, take-offs and taxiing
beeai lse it ii it > ' o l « - es i i "lai id i lse decision "'"" Si n i n,

las i IC it i ioi c ai ithoi ity o i- < ;: i tl ic:

regulation and use of water as a "land use decision" than it does the operation of an
airport.
Defer idai its ai e sit npb • \ v i oi ig it I c •< : i ltei idii lg tl lat of CI • I JDh I / \ bestov > s I ij: oi l
Summit County the p o w e r to define its o w n authority under section 17-27-4U1 auu to
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then adopt any regulation it deems necessary pursuant to that authority. To so construe
the act would give virtually unlimited regulatory authority to the County provided only
that the County first declare the regulation to be a "land use decision." No such authority
is granted under CLUDMA.
CLUDMA provides no authority for the regulation of water as a zoning power
under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-401 or otherwise. The limitation provision of Utah Code
Ann. § 17-27-1001 therefore has no application to the claims asserted by Summit Water
herein and the lower court erred in dismissing those claims.
II.

WHETHER THE MANDAMUS RELIEF SOUGHT IN THE COMPLAINT
WAS APPROPRIATE WAS NEVER DETERMINED BY THE TRIAL
COURT, AND WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF
THE COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT THE
LIMITATION
PROVISION OF CLUDMA APPLIED.
Defendants assert, as an alternative argument, that because Summit Water had a

review process available under CLUDMA, other plain, speedy and adequate remedies
existed and the mandamus relief sought by Summit Water was inappropriate. First, there
was no acknowledgment by Summit Water that the water concurrency determinations by
Summit County are pursuant to CLUDMA.

Second, the trial court did not rule on

Defendants' arguments with regard to whether or not mandamus relief was appropriate in
light of remedies provided under CLUDMA. Third, the trial court would have had no
occasion to make a ruling on that argument in light of the court ruling that CLUDMA did
provide a basis for the enactment of Ordinance No. 436.
Once the Court determined that CLUDMA provided authority for the County to
adopt Ordinance No. 436, and that the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001
12

therefore applied, the Court necessarily determined that the Complaint had i ol 1 ecu
til i idy filed i if idei 1:1 lat pi o v isioi i

i \..s si icl i, i 10 issi ic t ei i ia.ii ic: d foi deterniii latioi i v\ ith

regard to whether or noi M a n d a m u s relief was appropriate.
Moreover, i f i ! -u u: • . W: determined that C L U D M A does not provide authority
1 CM the adoption ••, «ordinance \\>. 436, tl le Coi u t coi lid i lot decide tl lat the re\ iew process
under seetioi I 1 ) 2 7 1001 pro\ ides a plaii I speedy ai id adeqi late i ei i ledy pi e cli iding
mandamus relief because that section would have no application to Summit W a t e r ' s
claims, Since t;^ ,.;;.e; ^ <*nubie re i icl identified t ; ih .uuiani.s m their argument woiild

because of the existence of such other relief
CONCLUSION

CLUDMA, the review provisions of lhai aei contained in Liali Code Ann. § 1,-27-1001
have no applicatioi I '•••- ^ i claims asserted by Summit Water herein, The court, below

limitation of CLUDMA under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001.
This case should be reversed and remitted for further proceedings on Summit
Water's fi ai id coi nplaint.
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Respectfully submitted,

SCOTT M. LILJA
CLARK K. TAYLOR
Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy
50 S. Main Street, 16th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84144-0450
Attorneys for Appellants Summit Water
Distribution Company et al.
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